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Variations of bilateral aid flows are difficult to explain on the basis of official development
objectives or recipient need. At the example of US aid to Pakistan, this paper suggests
alternative political economic explanations, notably the relevance of ethnic lobbying and the
relevance of US business interests. Time series regressions for the period from 1980 to 2002
and logistic regressions based on votes for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment confirm
the significance of these political economic determinants. While in case of the Pressler
Amendment, the direct influence of population groups of Indian and Pakistani origins seems
to have played a predominant role, the role of ethnic business lobbies appears to have
dominated in the context of the Brown Amendment. Time series analysis also provides some
evidence for the impact of US business interests based on FDI and exports, but these effects
appear to be comparatively small.
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General note
This paper is not meant to stress the long-term political rivalry between India and Pakistan
which, fortunately, appears to be mitigated now through join efforts from both sides. It is
meant as an example that aid policies tend to be determined by the utility maximizing
behavior of donor country politicians taking into account the particular characteristics of
their respective constituencies among which the ethnic origin of the citizens seems to play
a major role.
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1.  Introduction
 
  A growing literature in political economy suggests that development aid is determined by
the economic and political interests of powerful interest groups within donor countries.
This perspective on aid was first suggested in the debate on donor interests versus recipient
needs which was largely based on an empirical cross-country analysis of the geographical
allocation of aid resources to different countries (see e.g. McKinlay 1978, McKinlay and
Little 1979, Maizels and Nissanke 1984, Boone 1996, Trumbull and Wall 1994, Alesina
and Dollar 2000, Berthélemy and Tichit 2002). Other authors have provided political
economic explanations for the functioning of aid agencies and for the use of specific aid
instruments (see e.g. Vaubel 1991, Frey 1991, 1997, Martens at el. 2002, Easterly 2002,
Michaelowa 2003, Dreher 2003, 2004, Hefeker and Michaelowa forthcoming). Most
recently, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997, 2000) as well as Mayer and Raimondos-
Møller (2004) have suggested theoretical models explaining specific decision making
processes in the donor country.
 
  This paper applies the political economic analysis of decision making processes in the
donor country to the special case of US aid to Pakistan. Pakistan is not an extremely poor
country but nevertheless, it is among the 5 major recipients of foreign aid. Over the last
decades, Pakistan’s aid receipts show considerable shifts for which no obvious
development related reasons can be provided. This calls for explanations related to reasons
other than developmental efficiency which require a closer look at decision making
processes on the donor side.
 
  Looking at the United States as the single most important bilateral donor, we draw upon
earlier analyses of the effect of lobbying on congressional decision making. Numerous
studies, like Coughlin (1985), Tosini and Tower (1987), Harper and Aldrich (1991), Marks
(1993) and Baldwin and Magee (1998) empirically tested the hypothesis of domestic
lobbies affecting congressional voting behavior with respect to US trade policy. A more
recent study by Gawanda et al. (2004) also includes the effect of lobbies working for
foreign principals, e.g., for foreign governments and foreign business groups.
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  Anecdotal evidence suggests that similar effects might govern US decision making with
respect to aid to Pakistan. Pakistani officials allegedly complained that India was lobbying
to block US aid to Pakistan (Anonymous 2003). Within the United States, the US-India
Political Action Committee (USINPAC), one of the Indian expatriates’ lobbies, focused on
US assistance to Pakistan while defining its US policy objectives towards India (USINPAC
2003). The Washington Post noted the financial implications of the fight between the south
Asian rivals in the context of Senatorial elections in South Dakota (Morgan and Merida
1997). Today, Pakistan is among the major US allies in the so-called war against terrorism
and reaping the fruits of it in the form of strongly increased economic assistance.
 
  While the latter is a one-time effect, the relevance of ethnic groups within the US can be
measured throughout the last decades and therefore represents a suitable basis for
systematic empirical analysis. Similarly, it is possible to analyze the impact of US business
interests in the South Asian countries concerned. The objective of this paper is to provide a
systematic empirical analysis of these political economic influences and to answer the
following questions: Instead of justifying aid on development grounds put forward by
donors, is it possible to explain it on the basis of economic and political interests of the
population and / or special interest groups in the US? In particular, does the strength of
foreign lobbies (both Indian and Pakistani) or the relevance of economic ties with either of
the countries concerned matter in determining the allocation of aid to Pakistan?
 
  The study is divided into four sections. Section  2 provides a brief overview over the
development of aid flows to Pakistan during the last decades and clarifies the role of the
US as the major bilateral donor. In section 3 hypotheses about determinants of political
decision making will be presented and tested econometrically on the basis of data on the
voting behavior of individual members of Senate as well as on the available time series
observations on aid volumes. Conclusion will be presented in section 4.
 
2.  Aid flows to Pakistan: The evidence
 
  Pakistan belongs to the developing countries most heavily depending on foreign aid after
independence. According to data provided on official development assistance (ODA) by
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a total amount of4
US$  73.14  billion (bilateral and multilateral, at constant 2001 prices) was disbursed to
Pakistan from 1960 to 2002. The data in Table 1 show the different sources of these
resources. More than 72% of official development assistance come from bilateral sources
of which again near to half are provided by a single bilateral donor, namely the US.
Therefore, over the period as a whole, the US clearly appears as the major contributor. This
is true despite the fact that for the period of 1990-1998 US aid was almost negligible (see
Figure 1). During this period, Japan emerged as the most relevant bilateral donor whose
funding made up partly for the missing flows of US aid. Considered over the whole period
from 1960-2002, Japanese and US aid resources combined amounted to over 66% of total
bilateral ODA to Pakistan. Funding of the third most relevant donor Germany reached only
11% and other donors contributed a maximum of slightly above 5%.
 
  Table 1: Gross Disbursement of ODA to Pakistan 1960-2002
 
   2001 prices- US$ Millions
  Total   73143.65   100%
  1. Multilateral ODA   20328.84   27.79 %   (of total ODA)
  2. Bilateral ODA   52814.81   72.21 %   (of total ODA)
  (of which)   
            Non DAC   4299.43   8.14 %   (of bilateral ODA)
            DAC   48515.38   91.86 % 
            (of which)    % of DAC ODA
                 Canada   2561.9   5.28
                 France   960.56   1.98
                 Germany   5470.90   11.27
                 Netherlands   1093.88   2.25
                 Japan   10178.34   20.97
                 UK   3890.45   8.01
                 USA   21864.86   45.06
                 Others   2494.49   5.14
  Source: OECD / DAC (2004, Table 2a)
 
  Even though offset partly by contributions of Japan, the irregular contributions of the US as
the major bilateral donor led to considerable shifts in Pakistani aid receipts (see Figure 1).
The major reasons for changes in US contributions were the passage of the Pressler
Amendment and the Brown Amendment in the aid authorization bills by the US Senate in
1985 and 1995 respectively. The Pressler Amendment requested the US  President to
personally certify that there would be no risk of nuclear arms development in Pakistan, and
without this certification, no more aid could be committed to this country. The presidential
certification was no more provided after 1989 so that US aid disbursement to Pakistan,5
which was as high as US$ 452 million in 1989, fell during the early 1990s and touched the
bottom of only US$ 5.4 million in 1998. However, in 1995 the passage of the Brown
Amendment lifted the clauses of the Pressler Amendment referring to development
assistance and ended the legal binding of aid flows to the presidential certification on
development aid. New aid commitments were made and - somewhat ironically - turned into
the first noticeable disbursements just after the atomic explosions by Pakistan in May 1998.
They then went up to US$ 77.8 million in 1999 and further to US$101.4 million in 2000.
One year later the aid volume increased to 7 times as much and reached US$ 776.5 million.
Most of this US aid was disbursed in the framework of the Economic Support Fund as a
reaction on September 11. While disbursements fell to US$ 208 million once again in
2002, the US President announced another US$ 3 billion five-year economic assistance
package for Pakistan in June 2003.
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  It is obvious that more than pure development economic consideration drive the US aid to
Pakistan and thereby, to a large extent, the overall bilateral aid received by this country.
The development of aid flows before and after the atomic explosions casts some doubts
even about the relevance of the officially stated political motives for foreign aid. In the
following section, the US-Pakistan aid relations will therefore be investigated in the
framework of a Public Choice approach analyzing the determinants of the political decision
making process in the US. As general geopolitical developments are difficult to capture in6
empirical analysis, the focus will be on ethnic and business interests for which information
can be collected in a more systematic way.
 
3. The political economy of aid flows to Pakistan
This section draws largely from Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller’s (2000) theoretical paper on
ethnic lobbying with respect to aid as well as from studies on the political economy of US
decision making on trade policy. It is assumed that politicians are maximizing political
support by considering positions of different groups in the population while attributing
weights to their economic power and political influence as well as to the strength of their
interest. If overall political support is conceived as an additive function of support for various
mutually independent policy measures, maximizing overall political support is equivalent to
maximizing support for each individual measure. Under this assumption, we can consider
decision making on aid within the same theoretical framework as we would consider decision
making on trade or other major policy issues such as employment, education etc.
In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that we adopt a rather broad definition of
“political support” encompassing not only direct political support by voters benefiting from
certain policy choices, but also political support via the lobbying activities of organized
special interest groups who may carry out propaganda in exchange for desired policies or
“pay” for their preferred policies in the form of campaign contributions (Grossman and
Helpman 1994). It is considered that the weight attributed to any particular group by
politicians should be proportional to the direct votes potentially obtained from this group plus
the votes this group may indirectly mobilize on which ever way. This rather wide conceptual
approach has the advantage to leave the determination of the most relevant channels of
political influence to the empirical analysis rather than to restrict, right from the beginning, the
options to be tested for significance in the econometric model.
In the following, we will discuss which particular groups should be taken into account when
considering political decision making on US aid to Pakistan. On this basis, we will derive
hypotheses on factors increasing or decreasing the influence of these groups, thereby changing
the weights in the political support function and – potentially – the overall outcome of the
decision making process. These hypotheses will then be tested empirically in different ways:7
first through a time series regression of aid resources allotted to Pakistan over time, and
second through a logistic regression of congressional decision making with respect to the two
most decisive amendments on US foreign aid to Pakistan, the Pressler Amendment in 1985
and the Brown Amendment in 1995.
3.1  Incentives for decision making: some theoretical hypotheses
According to the press statements quoted in section 1, one might expect that ethnic groups of
Pakistanis and Indians within the US should exert a major influence on political decision
making on aid to Pakistan. Given the cultural ties to their home country, family relations and
economic linkages, expatriates in donor countries can be expected to care for aid inflows into
their countries of origin (Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 2000). Therefore, Pakistanis in the US
can be expected to favor any policy decision leading to increased development assistance. At
the same time, as far as aid to Pakistan and to the neighboring country India must be
considered as substitutes, Indians in the US might oppose such decisions. Moreover, India and
Pakistan being long-term political rivals, political decisions favoring Pakistan may also face
some general opposition by Indians and vice versa.
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Having identified two major population groups potentially interfering with decision making
on aid to Pakistan, we also need to discuss under which conditions their interest will be given
more or less weight in the politicians’ political support function. As the most direct political
support arises through voting, the numbers of US citizens of Pakistani origin on the one hand,
and of Indian origin on the other hand, should play a relevant role. Smith (2000) provides
some general evidence about how ethnic groups influence the US foreign policy through their
voting power. We can resume this discussion in an initial testable hypothesis:
1. US aid to Pakistan is positively related to the number of Pakistanis living in the
country and negatively related to the number of Indians.
                                                
1 While there is no rivalry assumption in Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller’s (2000) model, the assumption of a
substitution of aid flows to one country by aid flows to another country is a central pillar of their model, too. This
assumption reflects the hypothesis that the overall amount of aid (and in our case, even more specifically, the
amount allocated to the South Asian region) remains constant when financial resources to one particular recipient
are increased. In practice, overall resources do not need to remain fully constant, but they should not increase
correspondingly. As this appears to be a realistic scenario, we decided to always consider Indian groups
simultaneously with Pakistani groups and to let the empirical results decide upon the actual relevance of both in
the context of aid to Pakistan.8
Moreover, as influence can be exerted through lobbying as well, Pakistanis and Indians living
in the US could also play an important role by influencing other voters. Their influence can be
considered to be particularly high when they play a relevant role in the economy, e.g. when
they own many firms, make high profits and employ many employees. High profits also allow
ethnic lobbies to support politicians through campaign contributions. Campaign contributions
are the central factor considered in Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller’s (2000) model on lobbying
by ethnic groups. If a lobby’s potential to provide campaign contributions or its potential to
directly influence people’s votes rises due to a higher number of interested firms, higher
profits and / or an increased number of employees, policy makers can be expected to increase
the weight given to this group. Baldwin and Magee (1998) empirically tested lobbies’
influence along these lines on US trade policy and found it significant. This leads us to the
formulation of our second hypothesis:
2. US aid to Pakistan will tend to rise when the economic power of Pakistani firms in
the US increases, while it will tend to decrease with the economic power of Indian
firms.
Evidence from trade policy further suggests that besides domestic ethnic groups, lobbies from
abroad may also interfere with political decision making in the US (Gawande et al. 2004).
According to the US law it is permissible that any lobby registered in the US can lobby for the
interests of a foreign principal. It is often reported that foreign governments and foreign
business groups provide campaign contributions through their agents in US to buy policy in
their favor (Kim 1999). Gawande et al. (2004) show that in the context of trade policy, the
impact of such foreign lobbies is significant. Assuming a similar relationship in the case of
aid, we can formulate our third hypothesis:
3. Any lobbying expenses made by Pakistani government and non-government lobbies
will be positively related to aid flows to Pakistan, and lobbying expenses made by
Indian lobbies will be negatively related to aid to Pakistan.
So far, we have only considered ethnic lobby groups, both domestic and foreign. However,
there are also powerful US business groups with economic interests related to foreign direct
investment (FDI) in developing economies like Pakistan and India. These interest groups9
would like to ensure a high profitability of their investment as compared to alternative
investment possibilities (Schneider and Frey 1985). For this purpose they strive for more
foreign aid to these economies, so that foreign aid can build the physical, social and
educational infrastructure necessary for profitable economic activity (Harms and Lutz 2003).
As already pointed out by Maizels and Nissanke (1984) aid to such countries would, in fact,
constitute an external subsidy to ensure the continuing profitability of the foreign investment
of enterprises of the donor country. Thus, foreign aid activity should be positively linked with
the lobbying effort of these business groups and FDI from the US. The higher the investment,
the stronger should be their interest and the higher should be the weights they obtain in the
political support function politicians attempt to maximize.
Politicians providing aid to Pakistan can expect to be rewarded in the form of campaign
finance by firms involved in FDI in Pakistan. At the same time, again, if overall aid for the
region is fixed, competition will arise between those favoring aid to Pakistan and those
favoring aid to India. Moreover, investors in India might fear that strengthening Pakistan
through inflows of development assistance could deteriorate the geo-political conditions. It is
therefore conceivable that firms with FDI in India might oppose aid to Pakistan. This leads us
to the formulation of Hypothesis 4:
4. US aid to Pakistan is positively related to FDI of US firms in Pakistan while it is
negatively related to FDI of US firms in India.
Another factor which can influence the legislators while formulating the aid policy can be the
business lobbies’ export interest towards these economies. Foreign aid is often regarded as a
means to establish a close business relationship thereby encouraging imports from the donor
country, rather than from any competing exporter. Moreover, government negotiations fuelled
by aid funds can be the source of lower tariffs to enhance the exports from these donors
(Morrissey 1996, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1997). Many empirical studies find that major
donors adopt export oriented aid policies (see e.g. Morrissey 1993). In order to maximize their
profits, trade lobbies push the policy makers to give more aid to those economies which
constitute a relevant market for their exports. In return the legislators get more political
support and funds for their campaigns in the next elections.10
Assuming that the pressure for export promotion via aid depends upon the interest in a
particular export market which in turn is proportional to current exports, and assuming that
again, we have a certain competition between India and Pakistan, we can formulate
Hypothesis 5:
5. US aid to Pakistan is positively related to US exports to Pakistan while it is
negatively related to US exports to India.
Looking at the decision making by each individual legislator, there are some additional factors
which may affect the utility function of the representatives. While they do not provide a
concrete explanation of the policies at hand, they are relevant control variables and therefore
need to be taken into account. In US trade policy studies, the most commonly used factor is
party affiliation (see e.g. Hersch and McDougall 2000). Generally, it is anticipated that the
representatives vote in party line. Peltzman (1984) considers parties as interest groups which
affect voting behavior in a similar way than other interest groups. Coughlin (1985) clarifies
that legislators vote in party line because they will be rewarded for their party loyalty in the
future. In particular, they will be nominated for relevant committees and will be given various
important assignments. In this way they can use their position for future reelection and
political and economic gains. Although no ideological position predefines the party lines in
the case of aid to Pakistan, it is anticipated that some distinct party positions will emerge and
that legislators will orient their votes at these positions once they are fixed. This leads us to
the formulation of our last hypothesis:
6. For both the Pressler and the Brown Amendment, US senators can be expected to
vote in party line.
Some economic studies of US legislation also consider ideology (e.g. liberal or conservative)
as a relevant determinant for policy decisions (see e.g. Kalt and Zupan 1984 and Kang and
Green 1999). However, Harper and Aldrich (1991) note that the American for Democratic
Action’s (ADA) score used for ”ideology” might simply be another proxy for party affiliation.
In any case, both factors are strongly correlated and many authors believe that among these
two, party affiliation is the more relevant determinant of voting behavior (see e.g. Peltzman11
1984). Anyway, as aid bills to Pakistan do not suggest any ideological position, ”ideology”
does not seem to be of any relevance for our analysis.
Overall, we retain the influence of domestic and foreign ethnic groups, the relevance of US
economic interests, and legislators’ party affiliation as potential determinants of decision
making on US aid to Pakistan.
3.2  Empirical analysis of US aid to Pakistan over time
In order to empirically test these hypotheses, this section provides an initial analysis of the
determinants of aid flows over time. Since for many relevant variables data are available only
from the 1980s onwards, we are constraint to limit our empirical investigation to the period
from 1980 to 2002. This leaves us with a rather short annual time series of only 23
observations and limits the scope for in depth econometric analysis. Moreover, it should be
noted that the discussion in this section can only refer to those hypotheses which are not
related to decision making by individual legislators. Empirical analysis on the basis of a
greater data set of individual legislators’ decisions on specific aid bills will be discussed in
section 3.3.
To explain the development of US aid to Pakistan over time, we use the data on gross
disbursements of ODA (in ‘000 US$ at constant 2001 prices) (usaid) provided in OECD/DAC
(2004). Disbursements rather than commitments reflect the actual spending of aid funds, and
gross as opposed to net ODA avoids the consideration of debt repayments which are carried
out under the authority of the recipient rather than the donor country.
In order to check the impact of ethnic groups as suggested by Hypotheses 1 to 3, we require
information on the relative strength of the population of Pakistani and Indian origin within the
US, on the economic relevance of Pakistani and Indian firms, and on the relative power of
foreign sponsored Indian and Pakistani lobby groups. While population surveys and business
surveys are carried out only every ten and every five years respectively, the data on lobbying
activity in the US is available on an annual basis from US Department of Justice reports
(US  Department of Justice various years). Under the US Foreign Agent Registration Act
(FARA), every lobby working in the US as the agent of foreign governments or business12
associations is required to register with the justice department and to provide details including
the name of the foreign principal, the purpose of the lobbying activity and the financial
resources received from the foreign principal. The resulting reports are presented annually to
the Congress by the US Attorney General.
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The data on financial resources are further divided into expenses of the Pakistani and Indian
government (government lobbying expenses, glepak and gleind respectively) and the expenses
of other, non-governmental institutions like industrial or commercial organizations (non-
government lobbying expenses, nglepak and ngleind). While government lobbies are generally
considered as lobbying for the broad range of issues in international economics and politics,
non-governmental lobbies are more specific in their objectives like investment and trade
relations. Just as aid data, lobbying expenses are reported in ‘000 US$ at constant 2001 prices.
While annual population data are not available, the relevance of the population pressure of the
Pakistani and Indian communities in the US can be approximated by data on naturalization. In
fact, this variable might even capture the political influence of these ethnic groups more
accurately than simple population figures since only US citizens belong to the electorate
wooed by political decision makers. Annual data on naturalization of Pakistanis (paknat) and
Indians (indnat) is available from the Year Book of Immigration Statistics (US Department of
Homeland Security 2003).
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In order to test the impact of US economic interests in aid to Pakistan as suggested by
Hypotheses 4 and 5, we also require data on FDI as well as on exports. Data on US direct
investment in Pakistan (usfdipak) and India (usfdiind) are provided by the US Department of
Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) while US exports to Pakistan (usexpak) and
India (usexind) are available from the US Census Bureau - Foreign Trade Division (2004). All
figures are again adjusted to constant 2001 prices and reported in ‘000 US$.
We finally consider two control variables one of which is a simple dummy (dummy01) for the
year 2001 which must be expected to exceptionally affect aid as a reaction to September 11
and the new strategic partnership with Pakistan. The second is US aid to Pakistan lagged by
                                                
2 For further details about political activity by foreign lobbies, see Gawanda et al. (2004).
3 Formerly entitled ”Statistical Year Book of Immigration and Naturalization Service” (US Department of Justice
1986, 1994 and 1999).13
one period (usaid(-1)) which should reflect a certain sluggishness of changes in aid
disbursements.
Table 2 presents the results of our regression analysis. As could be expected, the 2001 dummy
and lagged US aid are highly significant in all regressions in which they are included. Ceteris
paribus, the effect of September 11 led to an increase of US aid to Pakistan of 700-800 million
US$.
As compared to this huge one-time effect, coefficients of other political variables appear
rather modest in size. Nevertheless, their impact is non-negligible and significant in most
specifications. Regarding ethnic lobbying, the variable finally selected for the regression
models presented here is non-government lobbying expenses. It is included in
specifications  1  and  3. Regression coefficients show the expected sign indicating that
Pakistani lobbying positively affects aid while Indian lobbying has the opposite effect.
According to Regression 1, a one thousand US$ increase in Pakistani lobbying expenses leads
to an 8 million increase in US aid to Pakistan. The same increase in Indian lobby expenses
reduces US aid to Pakistan by about 0.1 million US$. While the size of the coefficients is not
robust across specifications, it clearly comes out that Pakistani lobby expenses have a much
higher effect than Indian lobby expenses. This could reflect that aid to Pakistan is regarded
only as a partial substitute for aid to India. In this case, the higher effectiveness of Pakistani
lobbies with respect to aid to Pakistan is easily explained since US aid to Pakistan then be a
central objective of Pakistani lobbying expenses, while most of the Indian lobbying resources
can be assumed to be spent on other issues.
It is interesting to note that the same significant results could not be found with respect to
government lobbying expenses. This may be interpreted as an indication that lobbying driven
by private business interests has a stronger focus and impact than government lobbying.
However, as both variables are correlated and the available evidence is based on rather few
observations, this interpretation should be considered with caution. It could also be that
government lobbying is simply not so well measured as governments may try to hide their
channels of influence.14
Including the naturalization variable is not significant either. This might be due to the reason
that during the period of analysis the naturalization process was very strict so that there were
very few Pakistanis and Indians that were effectively naturalized (see Annex A, Table A2). In
fact, the naturalization of just a few individuals cannot really be expected to show any
significant effect on US aid policy.
There is another problem related to the small sample size. Increasing the number of
explanatory variables to more than four or five makes it very difficult to find any significant
effects due to the limited degrees of freedom in the regression. For this reason, not all
variables thought to be relevant could be included in the regression simultaneously. Including
lagged aid but leaving the specification of Regression 1 and 3 unchanged otherwise, leads to
regression coefficients which still show the expected signs, but are almost all just below the
level of significance. The same problem arises with respect to the variables introduced to
measure the influence of US business interests abroad. When both exports and FDI are
included into the regression simultaneously, hardly any significant impact can be
distinguished. However, when either of the two is included separately, they turn out to be
significant (Regressions 2 and 4).
For a given amount of funds spent on either FDI or exports, it seems that FDI induces a
stronger business pressure with respect to aid. This is reflected both in the values of the
coefficients and in their level of significance. The variables indicating exports and FDI to
India are significant in all four specifications presented in Table 2, while this is not the case
for those to Pakistan. A possible reason could be that the volume of US exports and FDI to
Pakistan is relatively limited (cf. Annex  A, Table  A2) so that small absolute errors in
measurement can lead to important relative divergences blurring the true underlying
relationship. Regression coefficients in Regression  1 where FDI to both countries is
significant, indicate that US aid to Pakistan increases by 1800 US$ if FDI to Pakistan rises by
1000 US$, while it decreases by 1620 US$ if FDI to India rises by the same amount. Note that
even though this seems to again imply a stronger impact of lobbies directly involved with
Pakistan as compared to those primarily involved with India, the relatively higher importance
is much less pronounced (and also much less robust across specifications) than in the case of
foreign lobbying expenses discussed above. But anyhow, the impact of one US$ spent on
lobbying has a much higher impact than one US$ spent on FDI or exports. This could be15
expected since exports and FDI are not primarily carried out with the objective to fight for aid,
and the US exporters and investors will only start to seriously lobby US government
interventions like development cooperation once they are heavily financially involved in a
particular country.
Table 2: Regression results for US aid to Pakistan over time
‌usaid Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4








constant 379046.10*** 118861.10*** 579352.10** 150530.50
N 1 82 12 0 2 3
R
2 0.75 0.79 0.67 0.71
adj.R
2 0.64 0.74 0.55 0.65
Breusch-Godfrey (small)
F 0.06 4.65 1.2 0.38
p-value 0.81 0.05 0.29 0.54
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For detailed descriptions
of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
Overall, the regression results appear to be plausible and relatively robust across differences in
specifications. General regression statistics are satisfactory. Depending on specifications, the
variables included in the model explain between two-thirds and three-fourth of total variation.
Using the Breusch-Godfrey test for small samples, the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of
residuals must be rejected only for one specification (Regression 2 with FDI and the lagged
aid variable). While the number of observations is limited, this initial time series analysis still
provides relatively consistent evidence for both the relevance of ethnic lobbying and the
influence of US business interest. With the data at hand, Hypothesis 3 finds support with
respect to the influence of non-government lobbying expenses, Hypothesis 4 on the relevance
of FDI finds clear support throughout, and Hypothesis 5 on the importance of exports finds a
somewhat positive support although less relevant in size and less significant than in the case
of FDI. Interestingly, while donor business interests have been emphasized in many earlier
studies, the relevance of ethnic lobbying first highlighted in the theoretical work by Lahiri and
Raimondos-Møller (2000) can be empirically shown to be much stronger in its impact per16
dollar invested. Finally, it should be emphasized that with respect to each of the factors
discussed above, the indirect effect through interest groups involved with India is found
significant as well (with the expected negative sign).
3.3  Empirical analysis of Senate voting on aid to Pakistan
Let us now adopt a different perspective and consider political decision making at the level of
each individual legislator. Using logistic regressions, senators’ votes for or against the Pressler
and the Brown Amendment can be estimated as a function of various characteristics of their
constituencies. We first consider each amendment separately whereby the dummy variable
(senate_vote) is assigned a 1 if the vote is cast in favor of the amendment and 0 otherwise. For
both the senate roll call and for the senators’ party affiliation (party_affln) which should be a
relevant explanatory variable according to Hypothesis  6, the data has been acquired from
Congressional Quarterly Reports (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1985) and from the US Senate
(2004). If the senator is a Republican, then he is assigned a 1 while he is assigned a 0 if he is a
Democrat.
As opposed to the time series analysis in the previous section, we now also have data on the
population of the different ethnic groups within the US (and the individual constituencies).
This data is based on the US Census of Population for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000
(US Census Bureau - Population Division 1983, 1992, 2004). For the year 1980, the data used
for both Pakistanis and Indians in each US state is based on a sample census whereas for 1990
and 2000 it is a 100% count. The population variables used in the context of the Pressler
Amendment in 1985 and the Brown Amendment in 1995 are computed as simple mean values
of data for the beginning and the end of the decade. In order to control for the size of the
different constituencies, we divide these means by the corresponding values for the total
population in each state. This yields four variables for the relative strength of both Pakistani
(poppak85, poppak95) and Indian (popind85, popind95) ethnic groups in each constituency.
As the US Federal Election Commission (FEC) did not categorize the Political Action
Committees (PACs) on ethnic affiliation, there is no data available for domestic lobbies of
expatriate Pakistanis and Indians. However, since we assume that effective lobbying through
financial contributions and economic pressure depends upon economic power, we have17
looked at minority owned businesses data. The Surveys of Minority Owned Business and
Enterprise conducted every five years since 1982 by the US Census Bureau - Department of
Commerce (1991, 2001) provide data on the number of all firms and firms with paid
employees, their sales and the number of employees working in these firms. Unfortunately,
data is available only for India and not for Pakistan. As the surveys were not carried out
during the exact years of the amendments and linear approximations using two subsequent
surveys was rendered impossible due to changes in definitions, we selected the closest years,
i.e. 1987 and 1997 for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment respectively.
While it would have been interesting to make use of the detailed information of firm numbers
versus firms’ sales and firms’ employees, it turns out that these variables are so strongly
correlated that if taken together, none of them is significant any more.
4 For this reason, the
regressions displayed in Table 3 and 4 include only the variable of Indian firms’ numbers
(allfirmsn87 and allfirmsn97 respectively). Results using only sales or employees are very
similar. As the correlation is very high even with the population variable, a second
specification introduces the variables powerind and powerpak which encompass all available
information on ethnic influences, be it on the basis of pure population pressure or economic
power. To create these indices, in a first step, all underlying variables were standardized to a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, and in a second step, the average was taken
across all these variables for each state
5 (see Annex  A, Table  A1 for a description of all
variables includes in each case).
Table 3 and 4 show the results for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment respectively. As a
vote for the Pressler Amendment can be considered as ”against Pakistan”, and a vote for the
Brown Amendment can be considered as ”pro Pakistan”, the coefficients of ethnic influences
in both tables are reversed. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis of ethnic
lobbying. Interestingly, it seems, however, as if the impact of the direct political support
through the population of Indians and Pakistanis has played a much stronger role for the
Pressler than for the Brown Amendment. This could be due to the fact that ever since the early
                                                
4 Annex B presents the correlation matrix for the different variables.
5 Example:
50 ,......, 1   state each  for  ,
2
1 95
























1980s, due to the Soviet-Afghan war aid flows to Pakistan had been a major issue of
discussion. Therefore, as opposed to the time of the Brown Amendment, the general
population was already well aware of the issue and followed the debates. Hypothesis  1
suggesting the relevance of ethnic population groups therefore seems to be influenced by
certain precondition of the voting process. At the same time, business lobbies with vested
interests and an existing lobbying structure appear to closely follow policy making in any
case. Consequently, the number of Indian firms is significantly and negatively related to pro-
Pakistani voting (i.e. in favor of the Brown, and against the Pressler Amendment). This
provides some support for Hypothesis 2 on the influence of ethnic business lobbies.
The index of Indian ethnic power in the US including both aspects of potential ethnic
influences on decision making is significant with the right sign in both regression tables.
In the context of the Brown Amendment, we can introduce an additional explanatory variable
in order to test Hypothesis 5 on the impact of export related US business interests in Pakistan
and India. As opposed to the 1980s where these data were not available, exports by state are
reported by the Foreign Trade Division of the US Census Bureau and the Global Trade
Information Services, Inc. from 1993 onwards (US Census Bureau 1995). Assuming a
proportional relationship between the volume of exports and the strength of vested interests,
the volume of state exports to Pakistan and India stexppak and stexpind is included in
Regression 9. State exports to India show the expected significant negative coefficient while
state exports to Pakistan do not turn out to be significant. Moreover, we again face strong
correlations between the different explanatory variables, so that stexpind loses its significance
when introduced jointly with other variables. As opposed to the similar regression in Table 3,
the general powerind and powerpak variables in Regression 8 include this additional aspect of
lobby influence. In fact, this implies that strictly speaking, they not only encompass ethnic
lobbying but also potential US business interests. Given the high correlation coefficients, it
appears to be difficult to effectively separate the different effects (see Annex B).
Finally, it should be noted that business lobbying variables as used in Regressions 5-9 all rely
on absolute figures, rather than on figures relative to state size. While relative figures appear
to be intuitively more compelling and seem to be the preferred choice in most other papers on
congressional voting decisions (e.g. Coughlin 1985, Tosini and Tower 1987, Baldwin and19
Magee 1998), we seem to face threshold effects here which cannot be adequately captured by
a relative variable. Figure  C1 in Annex  C shows a graph motivating the idea of possible
threshold effects at the example of the number and sales of Indian firms. It seems that only
from a minimum absolute number onwards, firms are able to organize lobbying activities and
therefore start to influence policy making. Annex C also shows the alternative regressions
with state exports relative to total state exports, and the number of Indian firms and Indian
firms’ employees relative to total state population. In these specifications, the corresponding
variables ifn and fpind are no more significant.
Table 3: Logistic regression results for the Pressler Amendment








N9 4 9 4
Pseudo R
2 0.21 0.18
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (*) indicates that the
estimate is just below the 10% significance level (α<11%). In Regression 6 powerpak is simply the standardized
value of poppak85, as there is no other suitable variable available for Pakistani lobbying power in 1985. For
detailed descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
Table 4: Logistic regression results for the Brown Amendment
senate_vote Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9








constant -0.55 -1.70*** -0.61*
N 100 100 100
Pseudo R
2 0.26 0.25 0.23
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For detailed descriptions
of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
In Table 5 finally, voting patterns for the Pressler and the Brown Amendments are analyzed
jointly. For this purpose votes cast in the Senate are recoded in a way that 1 always indicates a20
vote ”pro Pakistan” (senate_vote_pp), i.e. against the Pressler and in favor of the Brown
Amendment. As Republicans tended to vote against Pakistan at the times of the Pressler
Amendment and in favor of Pakistan in the context of the Brown Amendment, the party
affiliation variable needs to be taken into account separately for the two years (party_affln85,
party_affln95). Comparing estimation results for these two variables, it appears that in fact,
voting in party line has been more relevant for the Brown than for the Pressler Amendment. In
regression specification 11, party_affln85 is not even significant. Similar differences between
the decision making processes in 1985 and 1995 have already been noted above with respect
to the influence of the population of Indian and Pakistani expatriates in the US. If we allow
the coefficients of poppak and popind to take a different value for 1995, we obtain a
correction factor which suggests a greatly reduced impact in the context of the Brown
Amendment. In the Indian case, the correction factor is clearly significant.
As far as the influence of ethnic business lobbies is concerned, no such difference between the
two amendments can be observed and it seems that the corresponding variables can be safely
estimated jointly across the two years. Again the number of Indian firms within the state
shows the expected negative effect on pro-Pakistan votes. The effect becomes even more
strongly significant when we replace the variable allfirmsn by the joint variable including the
average of standardized values for firm numbers, employees and sales (”firm power India”
fpind). The index is constructed in the same way as powerind above, but does not include the
population variables as they need to be split over the two years.
The year_dummy variable introduced to capture unobserved differences between the two years
is insignificant in most specifications or just at the margin of the 10% significance level. This
shows that most of the relevant differences in the voting procedures of the two amendments
should be captured by the other explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we tend to keep the year
dummy in the regression, as it improves the significance of other coefficients.
All in all, we find consistent evidence for the influence of ethnic groups. While the impact of
ethnic business lobbies is equally relevant all through, the relevance of the share of the state
population from India and Pakistan plays a much greater role in 1985 than in 1995. As export
and FDI data by state are unavailable or available only for recent years, their impact could not
be tested in Table 5. Evidence from the Brown Amendment in 1995 displayed in Table 421
shows that there might be some influence exerted by US exporters to India, but correlations
with variables such as population and Indian firms are so high that this influence cannot be
isolated. Finally, as expected, senators are found to typically vote in party line. However, party
positions seem to have emerged much more clearly in 1995 than in 1985. Moreover, even in
1995, we find some variation and in fact, even the Democrat president opted against the
majority of his senators.
Methodologically, it may be observed that the above results have been derived under the
hypothesis that each senator takes a decision independently of any other senator once party
affiliation and all other explanatory variables are corrected for. It could be imagined, however,
that there are unobserved effects within each state drawing its two representatives in the
Senate into the same direction. If this were true, the independence assumption would be
correct and lead to an underestimation of standard errors, i.e. to coefficients appearing
significant while in reality, they are not. To test the robustness of the above results, all
regressions have been run again with an error structure allowing for state specific random
effects. The results indicate that while indeed the influence of some variables appears slightly
less significant, the overall outcomes reinforce our confidence in the robustness of the
regression results discussed above (see Annex D).
Table 5: Logistic regression results for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment jointly
senate_vote_pp Regression 10 Regression 11 Regression 12 Regression 13
party_affln85 -0.92** -0.69 -1.01* -1.09*
party_affln95 2.48*** 2.12*** 2.26*** 2.32***
poppak 5150.91** 4936.38** 12276.71* 12157.24*
poind -502.78** -529.78** -2248.89** -1822.66**
poppak95 -9014.11 -9073.44
popind95 2050.18** 1698.47**
allfirmsn -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002**
fpind -2.77**
year_dummy 0.51 -1.36 -1.37(*)
constant -0.4511 -0.63 0.78 -1.57
N 194 194 194 194
pseudo R
2 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (*) indicates that the
estimate is just below the 10% significance level (α<11%). For detailed descriptions of the variables and their
sources, see Annex A, Table A1.22
4. Conclusions
In line with the growing literature on the political economy of development assistance, this
paper analyzes US aid to Pakistan under the particular perspective of the potential influence of
two opposing ethnic groups, i.e. Pakistanis and Indians living in the US. Inspired by Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller’s (2000) theoretical model, these two groups are shown to exert a
relevant influence on the development of aid disbursements over time, as well as on the
outcome of votes for specific amendments passed in the Senate. While US business interests
abroad also play a relevant role, time series analysis reveals that the impact of ethnic lobbying
per dollar invested is even stronger. Analyzing voting patterns in the Senate, US business
interests and ethnic lobbying cannot fully be disentangled due to the high correlation between
these variables. In any case, evidence for ethnic lobbying is rather strong for the Pressler
Amendment in 1985 as well as for the Brown Amendment in 1995. Both of these greatly
influenced US development cooperation with Pakistan.
While in case of the Pressler Amendment, the direct influence of population groups of Indian
and Pakistani origins seems to have played a predominant role, the role of ethnic business
lobbies appears to have dominated in the context of the Brown Amendment. This may reflect
some differences in the political background of the voting process which implied that the
Pressler Amendment in the midst of the Afghan war was much more directly perceived as an
anti-Pakistani decision making endeavor. Finally, as expected, party affiliation also plays an
important role to explain voting behavior, but much more so in 1995 than in 1985 and with
parties switching positions between the two amendments.
All in all, using various estimation techniques and regression specifications, at the example of
US aid to Pakistan, this paper provides compelling evidence for political economic
determinants of bilateral aid. Although certain additional political economic factors such as
geopolitical considerations have not even been considered here, the overall explanatory power
of the regression models used is relatively high. As political economic factors in the donor
country cannot be expected to be closely related to the actual needs of the recipient, this raises
difficult questions with respect to aid effectiveness and the efficiency of funds invested in
development cooperation. It remains an open question how the direct interest of political23
decision makers in donor countries can be brought in line with the objectives of actual
development.24
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of variables analyzed in the time series model
Variable Obs Mean Units Std. Dev.
usaid 23 218220.90 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 185983.00
usexpak 23 859754.70 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 237836.70
usexind 23 2568587.00 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 827505.90
usfdipak 23 19438.26 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 55965.32
usfdiind 21 146102.10 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 202273.80
glepak 19 392.79 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 375.71
nglepak 20 14.80 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 30.54
gleind 20 4820.10 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 2146.39
ngleind 20 902.55 ‘000 US$, 2001 Constant prices 966.78
paknat 23 4073.04 numbers of persons 2736.58
indnat 23 16604.48 numbers of persons 10015.64
Table A3: Descriptive statistics of variables analyzed in the models across states
Variable Obs Mean Units Std. Dev.
Pressler Amendment
poppak85 94 0.00011 persons/state population 0.00013
popind85 94 0.00155 persons/state population 0.00140
allfirmsn87 94 956.00000 number of firms 1776.419
Brown Amendment
poppak95 100 0.00026 persons/state population 0.000303
popind95 100 0.00296 persons/state population 0.002810
allfirmsn97 100 3342.38000 number of firms 6759.945000
stexppak 100 16600000 US$ 34200000



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C1: Logistic regression results for the Pressler Amendment
with lobby variables relative to state size (rel.)








N9 4 9 4
Pseudo R
2 0.17 0.10
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. In Regression 6 (rel.)
powerpak is simply the standardized value of poppak85, as there is no other suitable variable available for
Pakistani lobbying power in 1985. For detailed descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Annex A,
Table A1.
Table C2: Logistic regression results for the Brown Amendment
with lobby variables relative to state size (rel.)
senate_vote Regression 7 (rel.) Regression 8 (rel.) Regression 9 (rel.)








constant -0.16 -1.17*** -1.04**
N 100 100 100
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.19
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For detailed descriptions
of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
 Table C3: Logistic regression results for the Pressler and Brown Amendment jointly
with lobby variables relative to state size (rel.)
senate_vote_pp Regression 10 (rel.) Regression 11 (rel.) Regression 12 (rel.) Regression 13 (rel.)
party_affln85 -0.92** 0.66 -0.98* -1.03*
party_affln95 2.28*** 1.98*** 1.99*** 1.96***
poppak 2767.17 2896.78 12049.59(*) 11180.75
popind -736.89** -685.67** -2298.38** -2111.12**
poppak95 -10655.73 -10004.95
popind95 2130.2** 1880.68**
ifn 1138.25 358.18 -1525.87
fpind -0.38
year_dummy 0.64 -1.05 -1.002
constant -0.19 -0.44 0.89 0.34
N 194 194 194 194
Pseudo R
2 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (*) indicates that the
estimate is just below the 10% significance level (α<11%). For detailed descriptions of the variables and their
sources, see Annex A, Table A1.33












I II III IV V
1 Category I: Number of Indian firms in the state are < 90
  Category II: 90 ≤ number of Indian firms < 240
  Category III: 240 ≤ number of Indian firms < 440
  Category IV: 440 ≤ number of Indian firms < 1 500
  Category V: 1 500 ≤ number of Indian firms
The five categories are defined such that we have an equal number of states in each
category.34
Annex D
Table D1: Logistic regression results for the Pressler Amendment
with state random effects (re)








N9 4 9 4
Wald Chi
2 7.22 6.40
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (*) indicates that the
estimate is just below the 10% significance level (α<11%). In Regression 6 (re) powerpak is simply the
standardized value of poppak85, as there is no other suitable variable available for Pakistani lobbying power in
1985. For detailed descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
Table D2: Logistic regression results for the Brown Amendment
with state random effects (re)
Senate_vote Regression 7 (re) Regression 8 (re) Regression 9 (re)








constant -0.55 -1.69*** -0.61*
N 100 100 100
Wald Chi
2 22.81 23.16 23.96
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For detailed descriptions
of the variables and their sources, see Annex A, Table A1.
Table D3: Logistic regression results for the Pressler and Brown Amendment jointly
with state random effects (re)
senate_vote_pp Regression 10 (re) Regression 11 (re) Regression 12 (re) Regression 13 (re)
party_affln85 -0.92** -0.69 -1.00* -1.08*
party_affln95 2.48*** 2.21*** 2.25*** 2.32***
poppak 5150.91** 4936.38** 12276.71* 12157.24*
popind -502.78** -529.78** -2248.88** -1822.66**
poppak95 -9014.11 -9073.44
popind95 2050.17** 1698.47**
allfirmsn -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002**
fpind -2.77**
year_dummy 0.51 -1.36 -1.37(*)
constant -0.45 -0.63 0.77 -1.56
N 194 194 194 194
Wald  Chi
2 43.31 43.96 43.79 43.75
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (*) indicates that the
estimate is just below the 10% significance level (α<11%). For detailed descriptions of the variables and their
sources, see Annex A, Table A1.